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1. The Intellectual Honey-moon of Russell 
and Wittgenstein and its End 
After finishing Principia Mathematica in 1910, 
Russell concentrated his efforts in questions of 
epistemology. In ”Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description” (1911), and The Problems of 
Philosophy (written in 1911 but published in 1912), Ch. III, 
he developed the epistemological implications of his logic 
in detail. At that time, Russell accepted that whereas we 
are acquainted with sense-data, we know physical objects 
by description only. More precisely, we logically infer that 
there are physical objects from the sense-data we are 
acquainted with. In 1911 Russell believed that this 
understanding is much more coherent than any competing 
philosophy of matter, for example, from solipsism, 
according to which there are no physical objects at all or 
from naive realism, according to which we directly 
apprehend material objects. 
Exactly at this point of his work, late in October 
1911 Russell met Wittgenstein. Soon between them arose 
an intellectual sympathy of higher form. On March the 22d 
1912 Russell wrote in a letter: ”His [Wittgenstein’s] attitude 
justifies all I have hoped about my work. . . . He has even 
the same similes as I have: a wall, parting him from the 
truth, which he must pull down somehow.” (Clark 1975, 
172) 
In fact, in the months between March and 
November 1912 Russell and Wittgenstein had a Joint 
Program in philosophy, on which they often worked tête-à-
tête, and in which they developed the major tenets of their 
later works. Incidentally, this was the only time in the 
history of Wittgenstein’s thought when he worked co-
operatively with another philosopher for months. Of 
course, Wittgenstein often criticised Russell’s conceptions. 
This criticism, however, was constructive. At that time he 
tried to advance ideas, supplementary to those of Russell. 
Wittgenstein’s visit to Frege in December 1912, by 
which the latter ”absolutely wiped the floor with [him]”, 
terminated his intellectual honey-moon with Russell—their 
Joint Program in philosophy was abandoned. The practical 
effect was that Wittgenstein decided to leave Cambridge 
for Norway (which he made in the autumn of 1913)—he 
didn’t need the collaboration of Russell anymore. The 
negative effect in theory was Wittgenstein’s criticism of 
Russell’s Theory of Knowledge (May–June 1913). The first 
positive result were his ”Notes on Logic”, written down in 
September 1913. 
Despite this criticism, the Joint Program in 
philosophy from March–November 1912 remained central 
to the philosophy of both Russell and Wittgenstein. From 
now on, main occupation of the two philosophers was to 
develop the already well-charted Program following his 
idiosyncratic intuition. In what follows, I am going to 
articulate this Program in view of its later implications for 
the mature philosophy of both Russell and Wittgenstein. 
 
2. The Impact of the Join Program on 
Russell and its Effects in Philosophy of 
Science 
Whereas Wittgenstein was a beginner in 
philosophy, in March 1912 Russell was already an 
established author. This explains why we are going first to 
find out the traces of impacts of the Join Program in 
Russell’s already available philosophy. 
This impact had several dimensions. Above all, it 
was manifested as a kind of sceptical radicalism in 
Russell, unknown to him before and after that. Most 
important document of it was his paper ”On Matter” 
(1912b), written in May–October 1912 but first published in 
1992. The declared aim of the paper was: To show ”(i) that 
all the arguments hitherto alleged by philosophers against 
matter are fallacious; (ii) That all the arguments hitherto 
alleged in favour of matter are fallacious; (iii) That, 
although there may perhaps be reason to suppose that 
there is matter, yet we can have no means of finding out 
anything whatever as to its intrinsic nature.” (Russell 
1912b, 80) The style used in these lines was perceptibly 
close with that used by Wittgenstein in his writings from 
1912–21. 
This sceptical stance led to changes in Russell’s 
philosophy of science. In ”On Matter”, he abandoned the 
belief that matter is an inference out of sense-data and 
accepted that it is a logical construction out of them. The 
underlying idea of this new understanding was that the 
world consists of independent units—sense-data, which 
can be both particulars and universals,—ordered in 
different, logically organized nets. In these nets the units 
are logically interrelated to one another. We can infer from 
the sense-data that there are (hypothetical) material 
objects. But if physics is to be applied, as for example in 
calculating the motions of the moon, it must be possible to 
derive, from the sense-data which we have when we see 
the moon, some object, either inferred or constructed, 
which satisfies the hypotheses of abstract physics.” We 
can advance many such hypotheses in physics which are 
”indistinguishable from the standpoint of the pure 
mathematician, since all give the same formulae, and the 
difference lies only in the meaning assigned to the 
symbols” (Russell 1912b, 83, 87). 
 
3. The Joint Program in Logic 
Parallel to Russell’s work on the paper ”On 
Matter”, Wittgenstein did some investigation in philosophy 
of logic. Indeed, the ”discussion of the problem of matter 
and of the nature of logic proceeded pari passu” 
(McGuinness 1988, 160). An evidence for this is the recent 
discovery, made by B. F. McGuinness, that on the back of 
”Matter—the problem stated” (the first MS of ”Nine Short 
Manuscripts on Matter” (Russell 1912/13), written shortly 
after Russell delivered ”On Matter” in Cambridge on 25th of 
October 1912), Wittgenstein produced jottings on logic in 
which the idea of truth-table and of the idiosyncratic 
Tractarian conception of one logical constant were 
developed for the first time.  
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In the jottings Wittgenstein advanced the idea that 
the truth-table is a logical symbol of the propositions under 
consideration (see Wittgenstein 1976, 177). This means 
that the truth-possibilities can be expressed employing a 
single sign for logical connective. Specifically, Wittgenstein 
discovered that logical constants can be reduced to a 
single operation: ”?” (in the Tractatus 5.1311 this sign is 
delivered as ”⏐”.)  
This point hanged together with the already 
mentioned (in § 2) assumption of Russell’s that the world 
of science consists of independent units (atoms),—sense-
data—ordered in many logical nets, in which the units are 
interrelated to one another. This is supported by the fact 
that the sign ”?”, which is to symbolise the 
interconnectedness of the logical atoms, was sometime 
used by Russell in the meaning of interweaving of the 
elements in a complex:1 they are tied together up—in a 
certain way.  
Later Wittgenstein expressed the connection 
between the ontological problem of composition of 
complexes and the assumption that there is only one 
logical constant thus: ”Wherever there is a compositeness 
. . . we already have all the logical constants”, and this 
means that there is a ”sole logical constant.” (Wittgenstein 
1922, 5.47) He developed this idea further, setting out that 
the relations in the Tractarian actual states of affairs and 
propositions have, in a sense, the same character as the 
relations between the objects in states of affairs. This 
means nothing but that formations of different order—(i) 
objects; (ii) states of affairs; (iii) propositions—are 
connected in one and the same way: through their 
elements that are hinged together as the joints of a bulky 
construction. 
Truthless Logic. This idea goes hand in hand with 
a Joint Program of Russell and Wittgenstein for Truthless 
Logic. Indeed, between April and October 1912 Russell 
also worked on logic. The product of this work was his 
paper ”On Logic”, of two pages only, written immediately 
after 13 October 1912. Its main thesis was that logic was 
the study of the logical form of complexes: ”It did not deal 
with judgements (which are a matter for psychology) nor 
with propositions (which can be false and hence cannot be 
anything objective but must be mere forms of words). 
Complexes will be recognised as identical with the true or 
asserted propositions.”2 (McGuinness 1988, 162) 
At that time, this was the position of Wittgenstein 
as well. He abandoned this doctrine only after he visited 
Frege in December 1912. 
 
4. Changes in the Project in Logic after 
Wittgenstein’s Visit to Jena in December 
1912 
They were made in three directions. 
(a) Truth-making. Wittgenstein accepted that the 
meaning of propositions is not the complexes which 
correspond to them but propositions’ truth-values (see 
ibid., 164). More precisely, Frege criticised the 
identification of complex and fact, accepted in the Joint 
Program, arguing that ”complex is not like a fact. For I can, 
e.g., say of a complex that is moves from one place to 
another, but not of a fact.” (Wittgenstein 1974, 199) 
Wittgenstein accepted this understanding; after some 
years of deliberation, Russell accepted it too. Indeed, this 
was a major change in his ”The Philosophy of Logical 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Russell 1905, Russell 1906. 
2 This was nothing but a variant of ”identity theory of truth” (S. Candlish). 
Atomism” (1917/18), when we compare it with his Theory 
of Knowledge (1913), which was based on the logic of 
complexes. 
It is of importance that Wittgenstein connected this 
conception with the truth-table method developed in his 
jottings on logic from November 1912, with some 
modifications, though. Indeed, already in 1912 the truth-
table was conceived as a compendium of the possible 
meanings of the propositions. What was new was the 
theory of many imaginary possible worlds, only one of 
which is real. On this understanding, the truth-
combinations are nothing but parts of possible worlds; 
parts of the real world makes some parts of the possible 
worlds, expressed by the sentences we use, true, or real. 
This was the theory of truth-making, developed in ”Notes 
on Logic” (1913) by Wittgenstein (see Wittgenstein 1979, 
95),3 and also embraced by Russell some years later in 
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (see Russell 1956, 182 
ff.). 
(b) The Doctrine of Showing. Especially 
spectacular was Wittgenstein’s criticism in June 1913 of 
Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement. As it was 
recently convincingly demonstrated, it was based on the 
doctrine of showing (see Landini 1991). Here it is to be 
remembered that Russell’s multiple-relation theory of 
judgement was grounded on the logic of complexes: 
judgements receive their sense through the logical form of 
the complex consisting of the judging mind, the individuals 
judged, and the epistemic relation between them. This 
understanding was made invalid through Wittgenstein’s 
criticism. To be sure, ”to Wittgenstein [from after 
December 1912], logical form is a matter of sense; and 
”sense” is captured only when it is shown. . . . There 
cannot be a theory of logical form” (ibid., 66). 
As it is well-known today—from the works of P. T. 
Geach,—the doctrine of showing was first elaborated by 
Frege. Apparently, the latter communicated it to 
Wittgenstein in their discussions in December 1912. 
(c) Tractarian Objects. The very idea of a system 
of objects, out of which the Tractarian world is build up—
through the medium of the states of affairs, which are 
nothing but concatenations of objects,—has its roots in the 
Joint Program. On this point too the Program was 
modified. How much? 
As already mentioned, in The Problems of 
Philosophy Russell accepted that sense-data are not to be 
found in the outer but in the inner world. They are only 
what we directly perceive. The realm of sense-data 
comprises colours, sounds, (the private) space, time (see 
Russell 1912a, 45). They are formed as individuals so that 
they can be perceived in isolation. 
Obviously, in 1912 this was also the view of 
Wittgenstein. After his reformation through Frege, 
however, he revised it considerably. In the Tractatus, he 
accepted that we never know the stuff out of which the 
sense-data are build. We know them only when they are 
organized in certain shape, form, size, etc.; but we don’t 
know them ”in themselves”. Further, he called exactly parts 
of this rough, non-organize stuff—not the sense-data 
themselves—objects. This explains the Tractarian 
statement that objects are colorless (2.0232); they are the 
substance of the world (2.021). 
The objects receive their configuration when they 
are molded into forms. Before this moment, they were only 
possible; now they are real. This assumption was a clear 
step towards a form of ”modal atomism” (Raymond 
                                                     
3 See Milkov 2001. 
The Join Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein (March–November 1912) and its Downfall – Nikolay Milkov 
 
 
 164 
Bradley, Brian Skyrms), apparently suggested by the 
doctrine of possible worlds, embraced by Wittgenstein 
after December 1912 (and already mentioned in (a)).  
Exactly like the idea of showing and saying, 
Wittgenstein’s new understanding of sense-data was not 
assimilated by Russell. This explains why his form of 
logical atomism differs considerably from that of 
Wittgenstein.4 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 On the difference between Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism see 
Livingston 2001. 
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